Following Orders

[Marcus of Ibelin]

Did you use the black edging or did you find a silver/gray one?

[Monsignor de Beaumanoir]

My helmet was dark to begin with, so I used a black edging.

[Sir Samuel]

Gentlemen It is good to stop by and read this thread. I just need to do it more often. So much has been passed. But I see alot of wonderful things going on and a New protege` on the rise of Templars. I trust all had a great HOLIDAY. I will be attending  TNRen if any are heading down for opening weekend of the 1-2 of may I shalll see you there.

[Monsignor de Beaumanoir]

It's funny......the casual banter of this thread about conversion, and excommunications....all in good fun, but my recent visit to the Georgia Renaissance Festival provided me the opportunity to explore a little more one of these topics: conversion.
We're all familiar by now of the three primary Military Orders of the Crusades, (you'd better be, if you've read them from post #1 to this point), so I'd like to share a little info on the concept of "Conversion" of distant populations, pagans, heretics, and any others I might have missed as it pertains to the Military Orders.

The following information (with some of my personal notes placed in it) is from the:

Journal of Medieval History 28 (2002) 1–22
The military orders and the conversion of Muslims in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries
by Alan Forey

Descriptions of the activities of military orders only rarely included any reference to the
conversion of Muslims, and in practice the orders did not seek to impose Christianity by force.
They were at times also reluctant to allow voluntary conversions among their Muslim vassals
and slaves, although claims that they sought to prevent Muslims in neighbouring Islamic territories
from accepting Christianity are questionable. The explanation of the attitudes displayed
by the orders is not to be found in the fear of losing their raison d'eˆtre or in the extent of
their understanding of the Islamic faith: they were adopting current attitudes, which were based
on economic advantage and probably also on perceptions of the nature of Islamic society. As
more attention came to be devoted in the West to missionary work, some criticised the orders'
military activities for hindering peaceful missions, while it was also argued — for example
by Lull — that the orders should engage in the work of conversion, using force as well as
preaching. But the writings of theorists had little practical effect.


The warfare to which military orders devoted themselves in Mediterranean lands
during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was seen to serve various purposes. In
some documents stress was placed on fighting as a means of salvation for brethren:
'they do not fear to shed their own blood as martyrs, and thus rejoice eventually to
end their lives for God alone'.

[Monsignor de Beaumanoir]

The practical objective was most frequently described
as defence, both of territories and of the Church and the faithful: some scribes likened
the orders to a wall or a shield. Yet military orders were also seen to be fighting
a war of vengeance and expansion. The latter task was usually said to involve the
freeing of parts of the Church from subjection and the recovery of lands which had
earlier been seized from Christians. Charters of donation not only include generalised
comments about expansion but also at times in the Iberian peninsula refer to assistance
given in particular campaigns and to possible conquests by the orders themselves.


It has been argued, however, that a handful of royal charters also envisage the
converting of non-Christians by the Templars and Hospitallers. A grant was made
to the Hospitallers in the middle of the twelfth century by Raymond Berenguer IV,
count of Barcelona, 'for propagating (propagandam) the faith and religion of holy
Christianity', and of the Templars it was said by Peter II of Aragon in 1208 that
'wherever the religion of the Christian faith thrives, they devote themselves to its
propagation (propagationi) and defence'. Similar statements may be found in the
documentation of Spanish military orders. In 1171 Fernando II of Leon asserted that
the brothers of Santiago had undertaken to fight against the infidel 'for extending
(dilatanda) the faith of Christ', and in the same year the archbishop of Compostela,
in favouring the same order, said that he wished 'to propagate (propagare) ... and
extend (dilatare) the faith and Church of God', while in 1231 Gregory IX referred
to the zeal which the brothers of Calatrava 'are known to have for the propagation
(propagationem) of the Christian cult'.

Yet it is questionable whether such statements were meant to refer to any involvement
of the military orders in conversion, especially as some of those making them
showed no interest themselves in winning Muslims over to Christianity. The Christian
faith could be extended in various ways which did not involve conversion: it
could, for example, be a consequence of the expulsion of infidels or the removal at

least of their rulers. Some documents relating to military orders do in fact refer to
such expulsions: the count of Barcelona in 1143 made concessions to the Templars
partly 'for the expelling of the race of Moors', and when in 1172 a group of inhabitants
of Avila associated themselves with the order of Santiago, they proposed to
extend their activities to Morocco 'when the Saracens have been driven from the
parts of Spain on this side of the sea'. The exiling of Muslims in fact characterised
some conquests both in the Holy Land and in the Iberian peninsula.

[Monsignor de Beaumanoir]

Although the relevance to conversion of charters which allude to the propagation
or expansion of Christianity may be questioned, a very few twelfth-and early thirteenth-
century sources do explicitly seek to link military orders with the converting
of Muslims. Alexander III's confirmation of the order of Santiago issued in 1175
contains the injunction: 'in their warfare they should devote themselves to this objective
alone, namely either to protect Christians from their [the Saracens'] attacks or
to be in a position to induce them [the Saracens] to follow the Christian faith'. This
statement was incorporated into the rule of Santiago and was also included in later
confirmations of Alexander's bull. In 1088 Urban II had sought to promote the
conversion of conquered Muslims in Spain 'by word and example', but cardinal
Albert of Morra, who was responsible for the 1175 bull, did not elaborate on his
precise meaning and the later sources are no more explicit. As Humbert of Romans
pointed out a century later, force might serve in various ways to further conversion:
conquest facilitated preaching to subjugated infidels — although missionary activity
was in practice more characteristic of the thirteenth than of the twelfth century —
and serious setbacks in battle could help to weaken the faith of Muslims. Baptism
could also be imposed by force; but in view of canonical opinion, it is unlikely that
Albert of Morra was advocating this method. The statements about Santiago have
nevertheless been linked with comments made by the Cistercian abbot Isaac de l'Etoile,
who in a sermon referred to a new order (novus ordo) which 'with lances and
cudgels forces unbelievers to the faith'. He saw the new foundation as using force
to convert. A chronicler of St Martin of Tours similarly asserted that the French
king, Philip II, left money to the Templars and Hospitallers to hire mercenaries 'who
would convert the usurpers of the promised land and recall them to the unity of the
faith'. Yet, while this writer named the two leading military orders, the identity of
the foundation to which Isaac de l'Etoile was referring has been disputed. If — as
has been argued — this sermon was delivered when Isaac was still abbot of l'Etoile,
it was written before the foundation of Santiago and could not refer to that establishment.
It has been suggested that the phrase 'new order' harked back to the term
'new militia' (nova militia), which St Bernard used of the Templars, and Isaac de
l'Etoile's comment has been taken to refer to them. Yet St Bernard was writing a
generation earlier. If Isaac was referring to a particular order, the foundation in question
was probably Calatrava, which became affiliated to the Cistercians and which
received rulings from the Cistercian general chapter in 1164. It is, of course, also
possible that he was referring to the military order as an institution, rather than to
a particular foundation: but, at a time when there were several military orders in
existence, he referred to an order, rather than to a type of order.

One reason which has sometimes been advanced for not associating Isaac de l'Etoile's
comment with the Temple or Calatrava is that these two orders did not seek
to impose baptism by force. Yet in fact none of the military orders confronting
Islam sought to promote conversion directly by force in the way that members of
military orders in the Baltic region in the thirteenth century sought to impose Christianity on pagans.
Isaac de l'Etoile and the Tours chronicler both lived far from
Christian frontiers, and were not well-informed about the orders' functions in Mediterranean
lands. Although chansons de geste allude to forced conversions and
although during the first crusade there had been attempts to coerce Muslims to accept
baptism, these were not imitated. The master of Calatrava, Martin Pe´rez de Siones,
is reported to have ordered the slaughter of more than 200 Muslim captives in 1170,
but this was not because they had refused to become Christian. In Mediterranean
regions the military orders gained authority over Muslims, both free and slave, but
did not coerce them to become Christian either at the time of conquest or later:
Muslims who passed under the lordship of the orders were allowed to keep their
religion, as happened on other estates. Although little detailed information survives
about the orders' vassals in the Holy Land, it is clear that Muslims living under
western rule there were allowed to preserve their faith, even if they did lose some
mosques. Any members of the Teutonic order who were transferred in the thirteenth
century from the Holy Land to the Baltic therefore found themselves confronted by
a very different situation. The religious freedom allowed by the orders to Muslims
in the Iberian peninsula is apparent from surrender agreements and cartas de poblacio
´n. In the charter granted by the Templars in 1234 at Chivert in northern Valencia,
shortly after it had passed into Christian hands, Muslim tenants were allowed to
retain their main mosque and to practise their religion freely. Similar terms were
conceded by the Hospitallers to Muslims at La Aldea, on the left bank of the Ebro
near Tortosa, in 1258. These agreements were, moreover, intended to be permanent:
the military orders did not envisage that there would in the future be any attempt
to limit religious freedom.

[Monsignor de Beaumanoir]

Yet if the orders did not seek to impose Christianity by force, it must also be
considered whether they encouraged and promoted conversion by peaceful means,
or sought to hinder it. Those whom the orders could most easily influence were their
own Muslim vassals and slaves. Little evidence survives about the orders' Muslim
vassals in the Holy Land. In the 1260s the author of De constructione castri Saphet
argued that the rebuilding of the castle meant that 'the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ
can be preached freely in all the aforesaid places [in the region of Safed] and the
blasphemy of Muhammad can be publicly refuted and demolished in sermons'; but
he was just expressing an aspiration, not commenting on Templar policy.

More precise evidence survives from Spain, although the extent of the free Muslim
population varied from one region to another: in the Campo de Calatrava, for
example, there were hardly any free Muslims on the estates belonging to the order
of Calatrava. Military orders were clearly in some cases reluctant to allow Muslim
tenants to convert, and penalised them for doing so by confiscating their land. Some
Muslim tenants paid higher rents than Christians and were obliged to perform labour
services from which Christian vassals were exempt: this was acknowledged by James
I of Aragon in his Chronicle, and is evident on Templar estates at Villastar in southern
Aragon, where Muslims were in 1267 to pay a quarter of produce in rent, whereas
Christian settlers there paid only a seventh on some crops; and some Muslim vassals
of the Temple in southern Aragon and Valencia owed labour services, while
there is little evidence of such obligations among Christian tenants in these districts.
James I had decreed in 1242 that Muslim converts should not be deprived of their
land, but, although this ruling was later repeated and supported by papal decrees,
it was not fully implemented on Templar or other estates. Berenguer of San Marcial,
who was Templar commander of Asco´ on the lower Ebro in the opening years of
the fourteenth century, confiscated all the possessions of a Muslim woman at Vinebre
who converted to Christianity. This incident has left a record only because Templar
lands passed shortly afterwards under royal control and an appeal was made to the
Crown: there is no reason to assume that it was exceptional. It is therefore unlikely
that the military orders in Aragonese lands reacted favourably to royal instructions
that Muslims should be obliged to listen to the preaching undertaken in the thirteenth
century by friars. The obligation of ensuring attendance rested mainly on the Muslims
themselves and on royal officials, rather than lords, but the latter could obviously
influence the response of their vassals. Certainly at the end of the thirteenth century
sizeable communities of free Muslims continued to live on some of the Templars'
estates in the Corona de Arago´n: the population of Miravet, for example, was still
predominantly Muslim at the time of the Templars' arrest.

[Monsignor de Beaumanoir]

Yet the practice of confiscating converts' property was not the custom in all parts
of Spain. Although decrees similar to that issued by James I in 1242 were also
enacted in Castile, indicating that confiscations sometimes occurred, fueros issued
by military orders in that kingdom reveal that in various places converts were allowed
to retain their possessions: that granted by the order of Santiago to Ucle´s in 1179,
for example, stated that 'men of Ucle´s who become converts can, if they have sons,
bequeath their possessions to them after death'. But there is no evidence to suggest
that the military orders sought to encourage conversion of their free Muslim vassals
in any part of the Peninsula. They seem to have been more concerned to protect
their Muslim tenants — whether by building walls around morer´ias or by judicial
action — against attacks by a hostile Christian populace.

There was similarly little readiness to promote the baptism of slaves. Since in the
Holy Land in the early thirteenth century it was the custom that emancipation should
accompany baptism, lords — including the military orders — often refused to allow
slaves to convert, partly because conversion was viewed by some slaves merely as
a means to secure freedom, but also, of course, because slaves provided manpower
and could be a source of profit through sale or redemption. The possible release
of slaves could also at times be used as a bargaining counter in negotiations with
neighbouring Muslim powers. James of Vitry condemned Christian lords who
adopted a hostile stance to the conversion of slaves, and that the military orders
were among them is implied by a letter sent in 1237 by Gregory IX to the patriarch
of Jerusalem and to the masters of the three leading military orders, stating that those
slaves who genuinely aspired to baptism should be allowed to convert, but should
not thereby lose their servile status. The Hospitallers do not appear, however, to
have sought to facilitate conversion in the period following the papal decree, for a
statute issued in 1262 ruled that no slave should be baptised without the special
permission of the master, although that did not imply that no slaves at all would
be allowed to become Christian.

The Hospitaller decree applied not only to the Holy Land but also to Spain.
Although it seems earlier to have been the custom in some parts of the Peninsula
for converted slaves to be freed, in the later thirteenth century baptism no longer
ensured emancipation, and could no longer be resisted by lords on the grounds that
it led to a loss of slaves. There were certainly a number of baptised slaves on
Templar estates in Aragon in the later thirteenth century: baptizati belonging to the
Templars are mentioned both in inventories of conventual possessions drawn up in
Aragon in 1289 and in records relating to the Templar trial there. As all recorded
purchases of slaves by the Templars in north-eastern Spain were of Muslims, it
might be postulated that the Order did not prevent its slaves from converting. But
not all instruments of sale have survived, and there was certainly a market in baptised
slaves. Although in the thirteenth century the proportion of baptizati among slaves
in Barcelona was growing, the Aragonese Templars certainly do not seem to have
taken measures to encourage the conversion of Muslim slaves, for the numbers of
baptizati on their estates appear to have been small: at Miravet in 1289 there were
forty-three Muslim slaves and only two baptizati. Although evidence about other
military orders in Spain is sparse, they are similarly known to have possessed baptizati,
but it is not clear whether these slaves were Christians when they were acquired
by the orders.

Although the evidence is limited — further research may reveal new information
scattered among the surviving sources — it is clear that in some cases the orders
sought to impede the baptism of both slaves and free Muslim tenants, and there is
little to indicate that the military orders sought to promote the conversion of those
under their authority. They did not themselves have the personnel to instruct potential
converts — the role of brother chaplains was merely to provide for the spiritual
welfare of their colleagues — but there were other ways in which conversion could
have been encouraged by the orders. A late-medieval prose version of These´us de
Cologne has the Templars rejoicing when more than 12,000 Muslims were converted
in a recaptured Jerusalem: 'the Templars displayed great joy'; but in reality the
orders' approach to the baptism of Muslims in Christian lands seems to have been
lacking in enthusiasm.

[Monsignor de Beaumanoir]

It has been claimed that in the East the Templars on occasion also sought to
prevent Muslims of neighbouring Islamic states from converting when they wished
to become Christian. Two well-known instances are reported by William of Tyre,
and his claims are echoed by Walter Map. The first occurred in 1154, when Nasr,
the son of the Egyptian vizir Abbas, was captured on the road out of Egypt into
Palestine and fell into the hands of the Templars. William of Tyre related that while
Nasr was in captivity he sought baptism and was instructed in the elements of the
Christian faith; the Templars, however, then agreed to ransom him for 60,000 dinars
and he was returned to Egypt, where he was killed. Lundgreen, whose argument
has been taken up by more recent writers, claimed that as Nasr was taken on 7 June
1154 and was back in Cairo only four days later he could hardly have made the progress
towards Christianity which William of Tyre postulated.
It would, however, be very surprising if a ransom had been arranged
and the return journey completed in so short a time, and in fact the thirteenth-century
writer, Ibn Khallikan, who provides precise dating about Nasr's later movements,
places his return in the year 1155. There would therefore have been sufficient
time for the kind of instruction to which William of Tyre alludes.
It can, of course, be objected that the chronicler was not in the East in 1154–5, and
that he was hostile to the Templars: but his report may not have been a complete
fabrication, even if Nasr's interest in Christianity may have been feigned. Yet, if
William of Tyre's account is taken at its face value, he is implying that, until they
were offered a large ransom, the Templars were prepared to allow the instruction in
Christian teaching of a captive: they were not taking the initiative, but were not
opposing baptism. In the last resort, however, financial considerations could not be
ignored. It is only Walter Map who argues that the Templars remained totally deaf
to Nasr's pleas to be allowed baptism; but he was writing in the West, and his
whole account is less plausible than that of William of Tyre.  

(This event is covered in Helen Nicholson's latest book on the Templars and describes Nasr as being executed by his fellow people upon his ransom from the Templars by crucifixtion, thus leading some "haters" of the Order's efforts as a sign that he'd already adopted Christianity, even though this slow and painful method of execution was well known in these parts for many years and not relegated to just Christians.)


The second instance concerns the incident when a Templar killed an envoy of the
Assassins in 1173. William of Tyre reported that the leader of the Assassins had
studied Christian writings: he and his followers therefore rejected the teachings of
Muhammad. Then, wishing to learn more of Christian doctrines, he sent an envoy
to the king of Jerusalem with the proposal that, if he was released from his obligation
to pay the Templars a tribute of 2,000 dinars a year, he and his followers would
accept baptism. Amaury welcomed the proposal and even agreed to pay the tribute
from his own revenues. On his return journey, however, the envoy was killed by
the Templar Walter of Mesnil, with the approval of his colleagues. A shorter but
similar account is provided by Walter Map, although he does express some reservations
about the accuracy of such reports. Lundgreen has pointed out that, as it
stands, the story told by William of Tyre does contain certain implausibilities, and
it seems to be based on misconceptions about religious changes among the Assassins.
The chronicler's interpretation has its origin in the declaration of the qiyama or
resurrection by the Ismaili leader Hasan II in 1164, but William misunderstood what
he had heard, and assumed that the Assassins were moving towards Christianity.
It was presumably this assumption which led him to believe that the embassy to
Amaury was concerned with the acceptance of the Christian faith. It has admittedly
been argued that William of Tyre had access to Amaury's version of events and that
his account reflects the royal point of view; but William reported Amaury's willingness
to assume responsibility for the payment to the Templars as merely a rumour
(ut dicitur). He was therefore not as fully informed as claimed. It would seem that
the embassy sent by Sinan, the leader of the Syrian Assassins, was of a political,
rather than a religious, nature, and the Templars feared the loss of tribute. The episode
cannot be cited as a clear indication of reluctance on the part of the Templars
to allow the conversion of Jerusalem's opponents.

[Monsignor de Beaumanoir]

The Templars were criticised not only for preventing conversion but also for displaying
undue tolerance of Islamic religious practices and allowing these to be
observed even in the order's houses. Frederick II, writing in 1244, claimed that he
had heard from some journeying from the East that 'the Templars allowed the afore
said sultans [of Damascus and Kerak] and their followers to perform their superstitious
practices, invoking the name of Muhammad, within the precincts of houses
of the Temple'. This is obviously a second-hand report from a ruler who was not a
friend of the Templars, and it has been maintained that Matthew Paris, who reproduced
the emperor's letter in his Chronica majora, dismissed the charges in his
Historia Anglorum and Abbreviatio, although it would be more accurate to say that
he did not repeat them. This story may well have been inaccurate, but in the later
twelfth century Usamah related that on one occasion the Templars vacated a small
church adjoining the Templar headquarters (the former al-Aqsa mosque) so that he
could pray in it, and also intervened when a recently-arrived Frank repeatedly tried
to force him to pray to the east. The Templars do not seem to have tried to impede
the practice of the Islamic faith by Muslims visiting the Holy Land. The requirements
of diplomacy would in fact have encouraged them to be tolerant of the religious
practices of some Muslim visitors.

It might, of course, be argued that the military orders would not in fact have
wanted Muslims in lands bordering on Christian territories in the East or Spain to
be converted, for widespread conversion of western Christendom's enemies would
have undermined the purpose of the military orders. When writing about the killing
of the Assassins' envoy, Walter Map claimed that some said that the Templars did
not want 'the faith of the infidels to be swept away in favour of the unity of peace'.
Yet, although there were frequent rumours about the anticipated conversion of various
Muslim leaders, these were almost always unfounded, and in the thirteenth century
friars had minimal success in seeking to convert Muslims living in non-Christian
lands. The threat to the orders' raison d'eˆtre was scarcely significant: conversion on
a very large scale would have been necessary for them no longer to be needed.
Military orders might in a few circumstances even benefit from a piecemeal and
limited conversion of Muslim rulers. It was reported in 1245 that Zeit Aazon, who
had been governor of Sale´, on the Atlantic coast of North Africa, was intending to
be baptised and was ready to grant the town to the order of Santiago. Innocent IV
gave his approval to this proposal, but Sale´ could not be gained without conquest,
and the plan was never implemented.

In seeking a more general explanation of the orders' attitudes to conversion, it is
difficult to relate their stance to the extent of their own knowledge about the Islamic
faith. Precise information on the degree of understanding displayed by members of
the military orders is, of course, usually lacking, but the extent of knowledge appears
to have varied from one region to another. The fullest evidence is provided by the
records of the Templar trial in districts such as France and Italy, where many confessed
to the major charges, for a number of Templar witnesses maintained that the
practices of which the Order was accused were derived from Islam. In some instances
comment of this kind was made about the denial of Christ and spitting and trampling
on the cross, which supposedly occurred at admission ceremonies. James of Troyes,
for example, who appeared before papal commissioners in Paris, asserted that he
had heard that a certain Templar knight, who had come from overseas and who had been among
the pagans, had brought to those parts the aforesaid errors, namely that at their
reception they should deny Christ, trample on the cross and spit on it;
and in 1307 Geoffrey of Gonneville, the master of Aquitaine, had claimed that the
denial of Christ was introduced by reason of a promise made by a certain evil master who was
in the prison of a certain sultan, and he could not gain his liberty unless he swore
that, if he was freed, he would introduce this procedure in our order, namely that
all who were admitted should deny Jesus Christ.

[Monsignor de Beaumanoir]

It might be suggested that these comments show an awareness of the Islamic denial
of the divinity of Christ and the rejection of the crucifixion. Yet some Templars who
spoke of Muslim influences referred to a denial simply of God, and it seems that the
opinions of these Templars were derived from distorted views expressed in western
propaganda sources rather than a true understanding of Islamic teachings about
Christ. A number of those, moreover, who linked accusations against the Order
with Islamic influences, did so in the context of idolatry: reference was made to
supposed Muslim idols. Gaucerand of Montpesat, who was interrogated at Carcassonne
in 1307, referred to an idol 'made in the image of Baffomet', and another
Templar questioned at the same time spoke of an 'image of Baffomet' and of 'kissing
his feet, saying Yalla, a word of the Saracens'. In an undated set of French testimonies
a brother alluded to a head called Magometum, and Bernard of Parma, who
was interrogated at Florence, stated that he had seen a head at a provincial chapter
and had been instructed: 'You are to worship that head because he is your god and
your Magumeth'. At Palombara in Italy a Templar also claimed that he had been
told that he should believe in 'one great god whom the Saracens worship ... The
grand master and each provincial preceptor has a certain image which represented
that great god, and displayed it in their main chapters and assemblies and they adored
it as their god and saviour'. Islam seems often to have been seen as an idolatrous
religion, in which Muhammad was regarded as a god, although the witness at Palombara
— unlike the authors of some chansons de geste — did attribute only one god
to the Muslims. Although the Templars were questioned about idols, it does not
seem that witnesses were encouraged by their interrogators to refer to Islam: most
of those testifying in the undated French testimonies spoke of idols, but only one
made reference to Muhammad. They seem again to have been relying on information
derived from western works such as chansons de geste, on which their notions
of Islam were based: they merely displayed stereotyped misconceptions.

Many of those questioned in western Europe had spent their whole careers in
districts remote from Muslim lands and had not served in the East. Yet most of the
Templars who did serve in the East had been recruited in lands far from the frontiers
with Islam, and had probably taken out to the Holy Land or Cyprus views such as
those expressed in Templar testimonies in France and Italy. Whether they acquired
a more accurate knowledge of Islam while in the East is not easy to ascertain. The
Templars in Cyprus denied all the main accusations against them and did not elaborate
on them. The correspondence of masters of the military orders and of other
officials in the East does at times provide incidental comment about Islam, but this
is not usually very informative. Letters and other documents, for example, even in
the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries commonly refer to Muslims as
pagans and to the lands of Islam as paganismus and paynisme. But terms were in
this period not used with any precision, and little should be read into the employment
of these words. The most detailed statement about Islam is that found in a letter
which, according to one version, was sent to Innocent III by the patriarch of Jerusalem
and the masters of the Temple and Hospital at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries in response to a papal request for information about the situation in
Muslim lands: this reports that the caliph, the pope of the Muslims, 'goes with his
followers to Magometh, the lord of the Saracens ... That lord Magometh is visited
daily and worshipped, just as the crucified Lord is visited and worshipped by Christian
people'. This comment does not necessarily reflect the views of all masters
of the military orders in the Holy Land: Usamah's tale of praying indicates some
knowledge at least of Muslim practices. Yet the Templar Ricaut Bonomel, when
bewailing Christian losses in the Holy Land, where he was writing, appears to see
Muhammad as the Muslim counterpart of the Christian god:

...Dieus dorm, qui veillar solia E Bafometz obra de son poder E fai obrar lo Melicadefer.

[Monsignor de Beaumanoir]

It would seem that proximity to Islam did not always lead to knowledge. In the
Holy Land, many knights of the military orders were men who had recently been
recruited in the West and who spent only a limited time in the East, although those
who held leading positions had usually resided there longer and would have had
more experience of contact with Muslims. Yet few members of the military orders
in the Holy Land understood Arabic: diplomatic relations with Muslim rulers were
conducted through interpreters. Literacy within the orders was apparently limited,
and most brothers could not learn from the writings of scholars or pilgrims who
did possess more accurate information. Those, moreover, who thought that they
understood the nature of the Islamic faith were not likely to seek to test the accuracy
of their views.

The fullest knowledge apparently existed in Spain, where members of military
orders were mostly of local origin and where contact with Muslims had existed since
the eighth century. The settlement charters granted by military orders to Muslim
communities in Spain certainly imply some degree of knowledge, although this refers
to Muslim religious customs rather than to doctrines. At Chivert the practices of
summoning to prayer, praying, fasting and going on pilgrimage were mentioned, as
well as the pool of ablutions used for washing before prayer (aliupum), while the
Hospitaller charter for La Aldea similarly refers to calling to prayer and praying
according to the Islamic custom. Various documents relating to the orders also
mention the use of the c¸una in the settlement of suits, although it is not clear to
what extent its nature was understood. The Chivert carta de poblacio´n does, however,
also state that if a Muslim had to take an oath 'he is not to be compelled to
give it by any other being or thing other than almighty God'. Yet similar policies
were followed both in the eastern Mediterranean and in Aragonese lands, even
though the degree of knowledge in the two regions appears to have differed.

Details of the beliefs and practices of Islam were probably in fact of little interest
to most members of military orders. The majority of brethren were laymen and, like
crusaders, concerned with territorial objectives, not with Muslim souls. The subject
of conversion is mentioned only very rarely in the rules, customs and capitular
decrees of the military orders. When these institutions did issue ordinances relating
to the issue, it was to safeguard their interests. Brothers were merely adopting the
stance which suited their purposes and which was then prevalent in Mediterranean
lands, for — although growing interest was shown in the West during the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries in missionary activity to Muslims and although some rulers
gave their support to attempts at peaceful conversion — the attitude adopted by the
military orders in Spain and the Holy Land in the main reflects common practice in
those regions.

The attitude of westerners at both ends of the Mediterranean was partly determined
by practical considerations. Manpower was needed to ensure that lands were worked,
and in Spain Christian lords were seeking not only to retain existing Muslim tenants
but also to attract new ones: the Muslims, for example, to whom a carta de poblacio´n
was granted by the Templars in 1267 at Villastar in southern Aragon were new
settlers. A harsh religious policy would have threatened the supply of Muslims,
who might prefer to live in areas under Islamic rule. This would be true not only
of any enforced conversion at the time of conquest, but also of later attempts at
obligatory evangelisation: this might encourage Muslim vassals to seek refuge in
territories still under Islamic rule. Economic concerns obviously also influenced
attitudes towards voluntary conversions of individual Muslim vassals, as such conversions
would sometimes have involved financial loss; and the conversion of slaves,
even if it did not lead to emancipation, probably tended to limit lords' authority over
those subject to them.

Yet in the Baltic region, where manpower was also needed in conquered lands,
Prussians and Livonians were coerced into baptism: and it could be maintained that
revolts and rebellions in Prussia and Livonia might have been averted if a more
tolerant policy about religion and other matters had been adopted.

[Monsignor de Beaumanoir]

In Mediterranean lands there were, of course, precedents for religious toleration,
as Christians had usually been allowed to retain their religion when living under
Islamic rule. It might further be argued that, despite the Church's stance on enforced
baptism, conversion in the Baltic was seen by some as a justification for the conquest
of lands which had never been under Christian rule. But part of the explanation of
the differing treatment of Muslims and pagans is probably to be found in the perceptions
which western Christians had of their opponents. The peoples conquered in the
Baltic area tended to be seen as leading a primitive and warlike existence and following
a primitive religion. Conversion to Christianity could be regarded as part of a
process which in time would make them more civilized and less hostile, although
this required the provision of instruction as well as baptism; and the former was
often in practice lacking. It is difficult to assess western perceptions generally in the
East and Spain about the Islamic faith: treatises written by scholars about Islam and
the image of Islam presented in the chansons de geste have been examined, but
brethren of the military orders are not the only ones among those fighting against
Muslims whose impressions are not easy to ascertain: knowledge was, however,
probably more widespread among Christians in Spain than among westerners in the
Holy Land. Nevertheless in both areas there must have been an awareness of the
nature of Muslim society, and Muslims could not have been regarded — as Prussians
and Livonians were — as a primitive people, for whom conversion would constitute
part of a civilising process.

As increasing attention came to be devoted in western Christendom during the
course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries to missionary activities among Muslims
— this is apparent not only in writings and preaching but even in visual imagery
— the military orders' focus on fighting and material objectives became the
object of criticism from those who favoured missions. These orders had from the
outset attracted censure from those who maintained that all warfare was evil, as is
apparent from the comments in the letter to the Templars written by a certain Hugh
peccator and from St Bernard's defence of the order against its critics. Such criticism,
which did not touch explicitly on the issue of conversion, did not disappear,
but from the later twelfth century onwards some writers did argue that warfare should
give way to the peaceful conversion of the infidel: there was therefore no place for
military orders. Walter Map wrote of the Templars that, although it was claimed
that the use of force against force was condoned in law,
it seems, however, that they have not chosen the best way, since under their
protection our territories in those parts are always being reduced and those of the
enemy extended; by the word of the Lord, not by the sword's edge, the apostles
conquered Damascus, Alexandria and a large part of the world, which the sword
has lost; and he further provided a condensed version of I Samuel 17: 45–7: 'You come to
me with arms, and I come to you in the name of the Lord, so that the whole church
may know that the Lord does not save by the sword'. He was arguing against the
expediency of using force, and for the efficacy of preaching. A similar point was
made by Roger Bacon in the 1260s. He asserted that westerners were often defeated
in the Holy Land; even if they were victorious, there was no one to settle the land.
Muslims who survived Christian assaults were made more hostile to Christianity and
it became impossible to convert them. In the East, as well as in the Baltic region,
'the Templars and Hospitallers and the brothers of the Teutonic order greatly hinder
the conversion of the infidel because of the wars which they are constantly waging
and because they seek complete domination'. He condemned the military orders
because they were seen to hamper the work of conversion. Roger Bacon advocated
peaceful missionary activity, although he did accept that force might be used, in
conjunction with preaching, to ensure that the Holy Land was retained in Christian
hands. Preaching was also favoured in a number of other writings, although these
did not allude specifically to the activities of the military orders: in the 1270s Raymond
Lull, for example, argued in his Libre de contemplacio´ that peaceful missionary
activity was hindered by warfare against the infidel.

While in some works the military orders were criticised for seeking material ends
which hindered conversion, the argument was also advanced that they should involve
themselves in winning over infidels to Christianity. The general point made by Albert
of Morra was taken up and elaborated in the thirteenth century. Although Humbert
of Romans averred merely that conquest might serve to facilitate conversion, some
writers maintained that force might be used more directly to promote it, and that
the military orders should extend their activities to bring about conversion, whether
by force or in other ways. Innocent IV asserted that if infidel rulers refused to accept
Christian missionaries into their lands, the pope could invoke the secular power to
oblige them to do so; and Ramon Lull in his Blanquerna and elsewhere similarly
advocated the use of force to ensure that preaching of the Christian faith was permitted
in infidel territories. Neither specifically mentioned the military orders when
advancing this argument, but in various works Lull maintained that the military
orders — or a single order resulting from their amalgamation — should work for
the conversion of the infidel, either by the use of force or by other means. It is to
be doubted, however, whether Lull assigned them this role in the Libre de contemplacio.
´When arguing in chapter 112 of the Latin version of that work that the Holy
Land should be won over by preaching rather than by the force of arms, Lull admittedly
wrote: progrediantur sancti equites religiosi, et muniant se signo crucis, et
impleant se gratia sancti spiritus, et eant praedicare infidelibus veritatem tuae pas
sionis. This passage has been translated: 'the holy monk–knights should go forward,
O Lord, buttress themselves with the sign of the cross, fill themselves with the grace
of the Holy Spirit, and go preach to the infidels the truth of Your Passion'. If this
version is accepted, it could be argued that Lull was envisaging that the military
orders should abandon warfare for preaching. Yet the Catalan version reads: faense
a avant, Se`nyer, los sants cavallers religioses e guarnesquense del senyal de la creu,
e umplense de la gracia del Sant Esprit, e vajen preicar veritat de la vostra passio
als infeels, and this has been rendered: 'Let the knights become religious, let them
be adorned with the sign of the Cross and filled with the grace of the Holy Spirit,
and let them go among the infidels to preach truth concerning Thy Passion'. In
this chapter Lull was writing about knights in general, not about the military orders,
and the sense of the Latin text is probably that knights should go forth as religious:
no reference to the military orders was intended. Nevertheless in Blanquerna,
written in the following decade, conversion was to be achieved by brethren of a
unified military order in part by skill at arms: knights should be sent to infidel rulers
and challenge their opponents by feats of arms to establish the truth of the catholic
faith. In this fictional work, the proposal was accepted and one such knight vanquished
ten opponents on successive days. The claims of religion were to be settled
partly by trial by battle, just as St Francis was reported earlier to have proposed trial
by ordeal. But in the same work Lull also urged that schools and places of study
should be created in the houses of a unified military order, where knights should
acquire a competence in languages and learn arguments which would allow them to
prove the validity of the Christian faith: peaceful persuasion as well as force was to
be used to win over the infidel. The knight who vanquished ten infidels by force of
arms also overcame non-believers by the power of his arguments.

[Monsignor de Beaumanoir]

In a number of later works Lull provided a variation on this last theme. He wanted
clerics knowledgeable in Arabic and other oriental languages to be members of a
military order created by the amalgamation of existing foundations. A proposal of
this kind was included in Quomodo Terra Sancta recuperari potest and the Liber
de acquisitione Terre Sancte: members trained in languages were to preach not only
to Muslims but also to schismatics and Mongols. The role of trained clerics in a
military order was, however, elaborated in most detail in the Liber de fine, written
in 1305. These brethren would dispute with important captives to win them over
to the faith; even if the latter resisted conversion, they could be taught about the
Christian religion, and be shown that Muhammad was not a true prophet. Captives
could later be freed and sent to Muslim rulers to inform them of the Christian faith,
which would facilitate conversion. Some of the clerics with a knowledge of Arabic
would also be sent to Muslim and other infidel rulers and inform them that the head
of the order would give them castles and cities if they converted to Christianity, and
would explain the faith to them. If the rulers were unwilling, they were to be told
they would be subjected to perpetual attack:

And they are to say to them, that the lord warrior king will give them castles and
cities, if they are willing to revert to the sacred catholic faith. And they should
demonstrate to them the arguments for our faith; and if they are unwilling, they
are to say to them that it has been decreed that the sword of the warrior will be
wielded against them forever, wounding and killing them.

The issue here seems to have been not merely the admission of missionaries, but
the acceptance of the proposals. The threat of violence was to be used as an
incentive to conversion: Lull was moving towards the attitudes displayed in chansons
de geste and the practices adopted in the Baltic region. In his later writings, however,
Lull did not always propose this association between a military order and the work
of conversion, and did not always link conversion with the use of force. In a number
of late works he mentioned both military orders and preaching to the infidel without
seeking to relate them.

Lull possibly advanced some of his views to the Templar master, James of Molay,
in 1301, when he visited Cyprus and lodged with the Templars at Limassol when
he was ill. But his opinions and those of Roger Bacon had little effect on the
activities of the orders. Few in the West advocated outright rejection of force in
favour of peaceful missionary activity; and Lull's works have attracted more attention
from historians than from contemporaries. Many westerners were not optimistic
about the possibilities of peaceful missions in Muslim lands. There would also have
been practical objections to Lull's proposed introduction of a new preaching element
within a military order, which could have led to divisions over the chief objectives
to be pursued; and the instruction of knights envisaged in Blanquerna did not take
into account the limited educational qualifications of most lay members of military
orders: many would have needed further instruction even in their own faith before
they could enter into disputations. Lull's plan in addition assumed that lay brethren
would be willing to adopt a new role. As Lull was writing the Liber de fine at a
time when the Holy Land had been lost, and there seemed little immediate prospect
of its recovery, the proposal that Muslims should be threatened with constant war
if they resisted missionary activities was also hardly feasible: it was only in Spain
that a realistic attempt could have been made to further conversion in this way, but
obviously no initiative was forthcoming. Lull's proposals, like the criticisms of those
who saw force as a hindrance to mission, went unheeded, and the military orders
continued to concentrate on warfare for territorial objectives, to the exclusion of
missionary activity.

So there you have it...in a large nut shell.... My fellow thread pilgrims.

[Sir Samuel]

Thank You Warrior Monk.
I had about an hour to waste, and reading this was just what the mind needed while the body rested.